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COMMENT
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
For the honest debtor who is able to comply with its conditions,
the Bankruptcy Act 1 offers the benefit of financial relief through a
discharge of indebtedness.' For his creditors it provides equitable
restitution, to the extent permitted by the bankrupt's available assets,3
through the distribution of his estate. But for the debtor who has
engaged in illegal activities in his personal or business affairs, a proceeding in bankruptcy-even one initiated against his will 4 -may be
the prelude to future criminal prosecution. Not only will the commission of bankruptcy crime be grounds for a denial of his discharge,"
but, in addition, his satisfaction of the comprehensive disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Act could lead to a subsequent conviction
based on his own statements. In these circumstances reliance on the
privilege against self-incrimination may be essential to protect the
bankrupt from penal consequences. Because the privilege does not
extend to the bankrupt's books and papers," it ultimately fails to provide
the security sought in its invocation. In addition, its restrictions on
disclosure could deprive creditors of information necessary for the
establishment and satisfaction of their claims. Finally, the bankrupt's
resort to the privilege, though compelled by his vulnerable position, may
111 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1964).
Bankruptcy Act § 14(c), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1964). Not all of the bankrupt's
provable debts are subject to discharge, however. Among those excepted are federal,
state, and municipal taxes, id. § 17(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1); debts for money or
property obtained by fraud, id. §§ 17(a) (2), (4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 35(2), (4) ; and wages
owed by the bankrupt, id. § 17(a) (5), 11 U.S.C. §35(a) (5) (1964).
3 Not all of the bankrupt's property is subject to creditor claims. Certain assets
are exempted by federal and state law. Id. § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
4 An involuntary petition in bankruptcy may be filed by creditors of a debtor who
has committed an act of bankruptcy. Id. § 3(b), 11 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1964). An act
of bankruptcy is defined in § 3(a), 11 U.S.C. § 21(a) (1964).
GId. §14(c) (1), 11 U.S.C. §32(c) (1) (1964). The list of crimes which, if
committed by the bankrupt, will result in denial of discharge appears at 18 U.S.C.
§ 152 (1964). They include: the fraudulent transfer of property belonging to the
bankrupt estate or its concealment from the court, the trustee, or the bankrupt's
creditors; the commission of perjury in the bankruptcy proceeding or the entry of a
false account in the bankrupt's schedules; and the concealment, destruction, or
falsification of the bankrupt's books and papers or of any document relating to his
property or affairs. In order to constitute punishable offenses these acts must be
committed "knowingly and fraudulently" or "in contemplation of bankruptcy . . . with
intent to defeat the bankruptcy law." Id.; See In re Topper, 229 F2d 691 (3d Cir.
1956); It re Milder, 131 F. Supp. 48 (E.D. N.Y. 1955). While a fraudulent conit was
veyance prior to bankruptcy can be avoided by the trustee, whether or not
made with fraudulent intent, Bankruptcy Act § 70(e) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 1 10(e) (1)
(1964), it is not a bankruptcy crime, and will not constitute grounds for denial of
discharge unless committed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the bankrupt's
creditors. See Hartman, A Survey of the Fraudulent Conveyance in Bankruptcy, 17
VAND. L. REv. 381, 418-19 (1964).
6 The privilege will not excuse the bankrupt from production of his books and
papers, when ordered by the court, because he loses title to his nonexempt property
upon adjudication. See notes 42-44 infra & accompanying text.
2
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itself result in the denial of his discharge,7 even if the offense he seeks
to conceal is not a bankruptcy crime. Since this treatment of the
privilege against self-incrimination in bankruptcy is of doubtful constitutionality, a method of protection is needed that will preserve the
rights of the bankrupt without undue prejudice to the interests of
his creditors.
I.

COMPELLED TESTIMONY AND IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION

The obligation of complete disclosure is perhaps the most essential
element of a bankruptcy proceeding. Its purpose, first, is to insure that
none of the bankrupt's available assets are withheld from inspection,"
for the just distribution of his property to creditors remains the primary
policy of the Bankruptcy Act.' Second, it is intended to prevent undeserving and dishonest debtors from enjoying the benefits of the Actbenefits designed to provide a fresh start in economic life exclusively
for the honest debtor.'0 Pursuant to this obligation the bankrupt is
required to furnish a substantial amount of information on his own
initiative. If he files a voluntary petition, he must also file a complete
and detailed schedule of assets and a list of his creditors specifying the
nature and amount of their individual claims." An intentional omission or a false entry on the schedules constitutes a bankruptcy crime, a
punishable offense for which denial of discharge is authorized. 2 But
the bankrupt, relying on the privilege against self-incrimination, may
refuse to disclose, since the mere listing of a particular asset could raise
7 Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (6), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (6) (1964), permits the court
to deny discharge if the bankrupt has "in the course of a proceeding under this title
refused to ... answer any material question approved by the court." This section has
been consistently interpreted to permit denial of discharge when the privilege against
self-incrimination is claimed in response to a material question approved by the referee.
See note 49 infra.
s See Note, Privileged Testimony Under the Bankruptcy Act, 28 ST. JOHNs L.
REv. 259, 260 (1954).
90See Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40, 42 (1962).
' See, e.g., Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549,
554-55 (1915).
"1Bankruptcy Act § 7(a) (8), 11 U.S.C. §25(a) (8) (1964). These schedules
need not be filed by the debtor who is contesting an involuntary petition filed by his
creditors, but if his challenge fails, he must prepare and file schedules within 5 days
after adjudication as a bankrupt. Id.; see Berg v. Hoppe, 352 F2d 776 (9th Cir.
1965).
Generally, however, the burden of disclosure imposed on the debtor who contests
an involuntary petition is only slightly less substantial than that imposed on the voluntary bankrupt. This is especially true in the event that the petitioning creditors desire
to engage in a fishing expedition, for it is possible that they may have no other purpose
than "simply to subject the debtor's financial affairs to a thorough examination."
See Trost, Involuntary Bankruptcy: Pleading and Discovery Problems, 22 Bus. LAw.
1207 (1967). At the trial or hearing of an involuntary petition, unless the debtor
permits discovery of his books, papers, and accounts, he must assume the burden of
proof on the issue of solvency, Bankruptcy Act §§3(c), (d), 11 U.S.C. §§21(c), (d)
(1964), a burden which would be difficult to sustain by remaining silent. After
adjudication, whether by verdict or consent, the same duties of disclosure are imposed
on both the voluntary and involuntary bankrupt. Id. § 4(b), 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1964).
12 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1964) ; see, e.g., United States v. Young, 339 F.2d 1003 (7th
Cir. 1964); Stim v. Simon, 284 F2d 58 (2d Cir. 1960); Interstate Fin. Corp. v.
Scrogham, 265 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1959).
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a suspicion of illegal acquisition.' 3 The privilege, however, will not
permit the bankrupt to refrain from filing schedules altogether,' 4 but
it will permit substantial gaps in the catalogue of his possessions. In
the event that the location of property thus omitted from his schedules
is well concealed, even the most diligent and persistent creditors may be
unable to assume the additional burden and expense of searching for
the missing assets.
Upon adjudication, which usually follows immediately after filing
a voluntary petition,' 5 the initiative in disclosure passes to the bankrupt's creditors, and to the appointed trustee or receiver of his estate.
The bankrupt must then submit to a virtually unrestricted examination,
conducted by his creditors under the liberal discovery provisions of the
Since the record of this examFederal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
ination is readily available to all parties in interest,'" the bankrupt cannot
restrict access to his testimony."8 Nor can he prevent the prosecutor
in a subsequent criminal proceeding against him from interrogating
creditors with regard to information revealed in the examination."
13 See In re Mutual Security Savings & Loan Ass'n, 214 F. Supp. 877, 882 (D.
Md. 1963).
14 Id. The privilege must be invoked with regard to specific items or entries
which the bankrupt is under an obligation to list. See id.; It re Naletsky, 280 F. 437
(D. Conn. 1921) ; In re Podolin, 202 F. 1014 (E.D. Pa. 1913).
15 The filing of a voluntary petition operates as an adjudication of the petitioner.
Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
113d. §§21(a), (k), 11 U.S.C. §44(a), (k) (1964). While the creditor examination could be commenced before adjudication of the bankrupt, in the case of an
involuntary petition, its scope might be limited, at that time, to the location of assets
or the discovery of information necessary for the administration of the bankrupt
estate. See text accompanying note 22 infra; cf. Rawlins v. Hall-Epps Clothing Co.,
217 F. 884, 886-87 (5th Cir. 1914). But cf. Georgia Jewelers, Inc. v. Bulova Watch
Co., 302 F2d 362, 367-68 (5th Cir. 1962), where even this limitation on the scope
of a creditor examination prior to adjudication is put in substantial doubt. With
respect to discovery, it has been suggested that the scope of an examination authorized
by § 21(a) may be even broader in practice than that permitted by the Federal Rules.
See Mulder, What the General PractitionerShould Know About Bankruptcy and
Arrangement Proceedings, 12 Bus. LAw. 170, 177 (1957).
17 Bankruptcy Act § 39(a), 11 U.S.C. § 67(a) (1964).
18 See Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923) ; Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S.
457 (1913) (bankrupt's books and papers must be submitted on demand, and may be
introduced against him in a subsequent prosecution); Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227
U.S. 592 (1913) ; Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889 (10th Cir. 1931) (schedules
filed by the bankrupt are available for use against him in a criminal proceeding).
19Bankruptcy Act §21(d), 11 U.S.C. § 44(d) (1964). It may be noted, in this
context, that "[plarties will not forget for the criminal trial what they learned in
the civil one." Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 CoLtra. L. REv.
1277 (1967). This problem is not unique to bankruptcy. In D'Ippolito v. American
Oil Co., 272 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), a civil suit for damages arising from
antitrust violations, the defendant, under indictment in another district for the same
offense, sought protection from the possible use by the prosecution of his civil depositions. The court ordered the examination of the defendant and its witnesses and the
production of requested documents with no one else present except parties to the civil
action, the witnesses, and counsel. The depositions were then to be sealed immediately
and not opened until conclusion of the criminal trial. While this order prevented the
government from using the depositions themselves, the court noted that it could not
prevent the government from learning their content by examining the witnesses
present at the taking of the depositions, or from introducing that information at trial
by calling those witnesses to testify: "The court realizes that its proposed order may
allow the Government to obtain additional means of obtaining evidence." Id. at 313.
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In these circumstances, the bankrupt may have no choice but to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination, rather than disclose evidence
that could lead to penal consequences. Of course, if the privileged
matter is of relatively little value, or if the information sought can be
obtained by other means, creditor interests would probably not be
severely jeopardized. On the other hand, vital information not generally available in the bankrupt's trade or business is often known only
by the bankrupt himself 20 and, in such a case, his claim of privilege
could substantially reduce the effectiveness of the creditor examination. 2
The need to rely on the privilege is especially acute in the
creditor examination. At this stage of the proceeding the bankrupt no
longer controls either the scope of disclosure or the subject of investigation. While discovery in the hearing or trial of an involuntary petition is limited to the issue of solvency and the establishment of an act
of bankruptcy,22 no such limitation is imposed on the scope of a creditor
examination. 3 Consequently, creditors who have been "stuck" may
reasonably be expected to undertake a thorough investigation of any
aspect of the bankrupt's affairs or property that might enable them to
uncover additional assets. The bankrupt, therefore, has considerably
more to fear than merely the revelation of bankruptcy crime. Strongly
motivated to stretch the scope of inquiry as far as possible,24 his
creditors may seek the disclosure of other criminal offenses which,
while not bankruptcy crimes, may nevertheless be relevant to the
examination of the bankrupt's affairs and to the production of his
assets for distribution.-' The bankrupt's commission of extortion or
supra note 11, at 1210-11.
21 See King, Constitutional Rights and the Bankruptcy Act, 72 Com. L.J. 315,
317 (1967).
Since this section author22 Bankruptcy Act § 3(d), 11 U.S.C. § 21(d) (1964).
izes, in the hearing or trial of an involuntary petition, "testimony as to all matters
tending to establish solvency or insolvency or ability or inability to pay . . . debts
as they mature," some courts have restricted the scope of inquiry at this stage of the
proceeding to those matters, and have prohibited discovery of information concerning
the location and administration of the bankrupt estate. See Trost, supra note 11,
at 1209-10.
23 Upon adjudication, the permissible scope of the creditor examination is not
even restricted to the bankrupt's financial affairs; he may be questioned with regard
to all aspects of his "acts, conduct, or property." Bankruptcy Act §21(a), 11 U.S.C.
20 Cf. Trost,

§44(a) (1964).
24

It might be thought that the creditors would exercise some restraint in these

circumstances, in order to avoid the obstruction of disclosure caused by the bankrupt's
invocation of the privilege. This is not always the case. First, creditors cannot
always know, when a material question is posed, whether its answer would require
the disclosure of incriminating information. Second, even if they do know (or suspect)
that their question requires an incriminating response, they will probably not be
deterred from asking the question, because they are also aware that the bankrupt is
under considerable pressure to respond, since his invocation of the privilege might
bar discharge.
2
5See Morris Plan Indus. Bank v. Schorn, 135 F2d 538 (2d Cir. 1943), where
the bankrupt was required to explain the loss of property which she had stolen. The
court rejected the defense that the stolen assets remained the property of their rightful
owner and decided, therefore, that they were properly subject to a turn-over order.
Id. at 540.
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theft, for example, would not in itself be a proper subject of creditor
examination.2 6 If it could be shown, however, that he acquired from
such illegal actions assets that are properly the subject of creditor
claims, then questions bearing on such independent offenses would be
Indeed, it hardly seems an exaggeration to conclude that
material.2
the scope of the creditor examination could be expanded to embrace any
past crime committed by the bankrupt if it was a source of income to
him. 8 The privilege against self-incrimination would then be applicable if the bankrupt were still subject to prosecution for the offense.-9
The framers of the Bankruptcy Act were not entirely insensitive to
the bankrupt's plight, or to the conflict between disclosure and the
privilege against self-incrimination. The legislation of 1898 included an
immunity clause providing that "no testimony given by [the bankrupt]
shall be offered in evidence against him in any criminal proceeding." "
But in 1938 a significant exception was added to the immunity: "except
such testimony as may be given by him in the hearing upon objections
to his discharge." 3' The limited scope of the remaining immunity
almost nullifies its effectiveness as a protective device. Its application
extends only to the bankrupt's actual statements, and does not cover
his schedules " or any incriminating evidence discovered through the
investigatory use of his testimony. The protection afforded, therefore,
is insufficient to remove the availability of the privilege against selfincrimination, which may still need to be invoked even where the im2

(As criminal grounds for denial of discharge, the Bankruptcy Act lists only
those crimes involving frauds committed against creditors or attempts to evade the
provisions of the Act. Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (1), 11 U.S.C. §32(c) (1) (1964) ; 18
U.S.C. § 152 (1964) ; see, e.g., In re Gentile, 107 F. Supp. 476 (W.D. Ky. 1952) (fact
that bankrupt's chief occupation was gambling, in violation of state law, will not
operate as a bar to discharge) ; In re Weinstein, 34 F2d 964 (S.D. Cal. 1929) ; In re
Chamberlain, 180 F. 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1910).
27The question must be material, not only because that makes it a legitimate
inquiry in the creditor examination, but also because it makes a claim of privilege
in response grounds for denial of discharge. See note 7 supra & text accompanying note 49 infra.
28 Of course, the extent to which the bankrupt's creditors would scrutinize these
sources depends, in a large measure, on the amount of capital that they could reasonably expect to extract from it. But if the creditors feel it to be worth the effort, it
is unlikely that they would be any more inclined to sympathize with the bankrupt's
vulnerable position than would a public prosecutor.
29 If prosecution for the crime were barred by an applicable statute of limitations,
disclosure would not endanger the bankrupt, and the privilege against self-incrimination
would not be applicable. See 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2279, at 482 (3d ed. 1961).
3o Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 7(a) (9), 30 Stat. 544.
31
Bankruptcy Act §7(a) (10), ch. 575, §7(a)(10), 52 Stat. 847 (1938), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 25(a) (10) (1964).
32
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913). Ruling that the immunity applies
only to oral testimony, the Court reasoned that the bankrupt's schedule, because it
"may presumably be prepared at leisure and scrutinized by the bankrupt with care
before he verifies it," needs no such protection. Id. at 599. This rationale ignores
the fact that the purpose of the immunity was, at least partially, to protect the
bankrupt in order to encourage full disclosure. See Ashe, Immunity of Bankrupt
against Self-Incrimination, 71 Com. L.J. 38, 39 (1966) ; Feibelman, The Effect of the
Fifth Amendment in Bankruptcy, 68 Com. L.J. 31, 32 (1963).
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munity is applicable.3 3 Moreover, the immunity does not apply in the
hearing on objection to discharge, in which the intervention of the
Attorney General's office is specifically permitted.3 4 Since it is most
likely that the commission of bankruptcy crime would be examined
at this stage of the proceeding, the immunity provision offers the bankrupt no assurance that he will not be subsequently convicted by his own
testimony.
Recently, Congress has enacted a more comprehensive immunity
applicable to proceedings involving bankruptcy fraud. The scope of
this provision, which is contained in the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,' 5 is substantially broader than the limited
n McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40-42 (1924) (privilege held available to
bankrupt in creditor examination even though testimony is covered by the immunity) ;
accord, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), where it was noted than an
immunity statute almost identical in scope
could not, and would not, prevent the use of... testimony [of a witness testifying under the immunity] to search out other testimony to be used in evidence
against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding .

. .

. It could not

prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be
attributable directly to the testimony he might give ....
Id. at 564; see Ashe, supra note 32, at 39; Feibelman, supra note 32, at 32.
Noting the detrimental effect of the immunity's weaknesses, Professor Wigmore
has implied that those who drafted it, assuming that they anticipated its practical
effect, might have been hostile to the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act:
Enacted as it was after the ruling in Counselman v. Hitchcock, and in terms
of the imperfect type of immunity above considered, it is difficult to imagine
that its § 7 [the immunity clause] was framed by any friend of the Act. Its
ineffectiveness to remove the privilege has been settled. But no steps have
been taken to substitute an effective phrasing.
8 J. WiGoRE, EviDENcE § 2283, at 528 (3d ed. 1940) (footnote omitted).
34Bankruptcy Art § 14(b), 11 U.S.C. § 32(b) (1964). The intervention of the
Attorney General's office is not always left to the discretion of the government; it
may be requested by the bankruptcy court, even if none of the bankrupt's creditors
oppose his discharge. Id. § 14(d), 11 U.S.C. § 32(d). See also It re Sims, 26 F.
Supp. 933 (N.D. W. Va. 1939), where it was held that when creditor objections to
discharge had alleged criminal offenses, the Attorney General may be requested by
the referee to investigate the bankrupt for the purpose of opposing discharge, even
though all creditor objections to discharge had been withdrawn. Indeed, the bankrupt
may find that the creditor examination to which he submitted has become a professionally thorough investigation conducted by the F.B.I. See Mulder, .pra note 16, at 177.
3-5Tit. III, 82 Stat. 197 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 18 App., 28, 42 & 47).
The immunity appears in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2514 (Supp. 1969):
Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of
any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any
witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United
States involving any violation of this chapter or any of the offenses enumerated
in section 2516, or any conspiracy to violate this chapter or any of the offenses
enumerated in section 2516 is necessary to the public interest, such United
States attorney, upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall make
application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this section, and upon order of the
court such witness shall not be excused from testifying or from producing
books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture. No such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerned
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used
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testimonial immunity of the Bankruptcy Act. It is invoked at the
government's request and confers an absolute prohibition against
prosecution. The immunity extends to evidence revealed in books
and papers, as well as to testimonial disclosures. However, application
is so restricted that the immunity offers no solution to the problems
associated with the privilege in bankruptcy. While not expressly
limited to a criminal proceeding involving bankruptcy fraud, the context in which the immunity provision was enacted clearly indicates that
it was intended for use in a criminal prosecution or investigation, and
not in a civil bankruptcy proceeding.e Moreover, it is likely that the
provision could not be made available in a civil bankruptcy proceeding
without conflicting with the provision of the Bankruptcy Act permitting
intervention by the Attorney General. Since intervention is authorized
for the specific purpose of opposing the bankrupt's discharge, the
government could not, consistent with that purpose, apply for the grant
as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except in a proceeding described in
the next sentence) against him in any court. No witness shall be exempt
under this section from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while
giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in
this section.
The application of this immunity provision is extended to bankruptcy through the
reference to §2516, which includes bankruptcy fraud among other listed offenses.
Id. § 2516(1) (e).
36It is not suggested that the immunity provision of section 2514 is entirely
unavailable in a civil bankruptcy proceeding; on the contrary, the statutory language,
which defines its scope to include "any case or proceeding before any grand jury or
court of the United States," clearly permits a broader application. However, the
Senate Report on this section points out that the immunity was designed and intended
to combat a specific kind of bankruptcy fraud:
* . . The major purpose of Title III is to combat organized crime .
Our free control of businesses has been acquired by the sub rosa investment
of profits acquired from illegal ventures, accepting business interests in payment
of gambling or loan shark debts, or using various forms of extortion. After
takeover, the defaulted loan has sometimes been liquidated by professional
arsonists burning the business and collecting the insurance or by various
bankruptcy fraud techniques.
Sen. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1968). Moreover, the immunity
is intended for application in the still further restricted context in which the bankrupt's fraudulent actions are merely a "front" for the more serious offenses of the
organized criminal syndicates, which are the principal target of the legislation:
Section 2514 of the new chapter provides for the granting of immunity
from prosecution in the investigation of violations of the chapter and the
offenses enumerated in section 2516 ....

[Tihe usual techniques of criminal

investigation will not, as in organized crime investigations, be adequate to
enforce the prohibitions of the statute. The privilege against self-incrimination
would work in most cases to prevent the principals behind the overt acts of
others from being held legally accountable.
Id. at 96. Finally, the emphasis of the Senate Report reflects the manner in which
the President drafted his request for immunity legislation, referring specifically to the
criminal bankruptcy law:
Last year I requested immunity legislation to compel the giving of testimony concerning activities having strong links with organized crime . ...
I renew my proposal that immunity legislation be extended . . . to the

criminal bankruptcy law.
Presidential Message to Congress, 114 CoNG. REc. 873 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1968).

1010

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.117:1003

of an immunity which might result in a guarantee of discharge3 7 Even
if the provision were available in a civil bankruptcy proceeding, however, it would probably have a minimal effect. Since its use depends
on the intervention of the Attorney General's office, it would be limited
to that stage of the proceeding in which such intervention is
authorized."

II.

CONSEQUENCES OF INVOCATION; WAIVER

The scope of the problem produced by the privilege in bankruptcy
is not limited to interference with the disclosure provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act, nor can it be completely solved by a mere readjustment of the existing balance between the conflicting interests of the
bankrupt and his creditors. Damage to creditor interests resulting from
the bankrupt's claim of privilege is only one side of the problem. The
serious consequences to the bankrupt himself that may follow his invocation of the privilege must also be considered.
37 Section 14(d) of the Bankruptcy Act clearly provides that if the Attorney
General's office intervenes in the bankruptcy proceeding, it must oppose the bank
rupt's discharge: 'When requested by the court, the United States Attorney . . .
shall examine into the acts and conduct of the bankrupt and if satisfied that probable
grounds exist for the denial of discharge and that the public interest so warrants, he
shall oppose the discharge of such bankrupt . . ." Bankruptcy Act § 14(d), 11
U.S.C. § 32(d) (1964). Since the immunity provision protects the bankrupt testifying
under its compulsion from any 'penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled . . . to testify," Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, § 2514, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2514 (Supp. 1969),
it must be concluded that the government could not both oppose discharge and confer
the newly enacted immunity on the bankrupt.
as Intervention is restricted to the hearing on objection to discharge. Bankruptcy
Act § 14(d), 11 U.S.C. § 14(d) (1964). Consequently, the newly enacted immunity
could have no effect in the initial stage of the proceeding, where voluntary disclosure
by the bankrupt is required, nor could it be conferred in the creditor examination,
where the privilege against self-incrimination would remain to block disclosure and
impede the objectives of the proceeding. It is possible, of course, that information
which the bankrupt refused to disclose to his creditors could be compelled by the government in the hearing on objection to discharge, but even if the immunity were
conferred in that stage of the proceeding, there is no assurance that the kind of
information desired by the government would be identical to that required by the
bankrupt's creditors.
Furthermore, considering the heavy price which the public must pay for any
information disclosed by the application of this immunity provision-a price which,
in the case of bankruptcy, would include the enjoyment of discharge by the dishonest
bankrupt as well as the pardon of any offenses disclosed by his testimony-it seems
unlikely from a practical point of view that a United States attorney would consider
that the public interest warranted its application except in circumstances involving an
element of organized criminal activity. Even if a civil bankruptcy proceeding were
initiated by an individual whose business had been taken over by organized crime, it is
doubtful that the Attorney General's office would intervene at that time for the purpose
of compelling immunized testimony, since that would automatically result in a
guaranteed grant of discharge. Rather, the government would probably restrict
the purpose of its intervention to the introduction of evidence indicating the commission of bankruptcy crime, thereby preventing the bankrupt's discharge, and saving
its application for immunity until the trial of such crimes. At that time, the
immunity could be used for its intended purpose, to discover information concerning
the criminals behind the overt acts of the bankrupt, but it would not have the undesired
effect of securing discharge for a dishonest debtor.
In short, the immunity provision of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act is neither appropriate nor adequate to rectify the damage to creditor interests
caused by the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination in bankruptcy
proceedings.
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One of those possible consequences is imprisonment; if the bankrupt invokes the privilege in response to a court order directing the
production of assets or books and papers, he risks the penalty of indefinite confinement for contempt. 9 A contempt citation may not be
issued unless the evidence clearly indicates that the bankrupt is presently
in possession or control of the assets or records demanded in the turnover order,4" but that is apparently its only limitation.4 ' Based on the
technical ground that the privilege attaches solely to property to which
the claimant holds title,42 this limitation on its application takes effect
as soon as a petition in bankruptcy is filed, whether by the bankrupt
himself or by his creditors.43 Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act makes
39 Bankruptcy Act § 41, 11 U.S.C. § 69 (1964) ; see, e.g., In re Sterling-Harris
Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1963).
In some cases the term of imprisonment for contempt may be indefinite at the
outset and terminable only at the discretion of the court. In United States ex rel.
Pagano v. Fitzpatrick, 330 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1964), the court denied an imprisoned
bankrupt's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the sole ground that "less than a
year" was not enough time to purge him of contempt:
The passage of time will eventually erode the inference of continued control
of stolen funds

...

but here less than a year has passed, and Pagano has

offered no plausible account of what happened to them. The bankruptcy
court should not be forced to abandon its coercive effort as yet.
Id. at
954 (citation omitted).
4
OSee Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948), where the Supreme Court restricted
the applicability of the doctrine of continued possession when, despite evidence indicating that missing assets had been in the bankrupt's possession immediately prior to
bankruptcy, the bankrupt refused to comply with a turn-over order. The Court held
that a contempt citation could not be based on that doctrine without the additional
evidence that the missing assets were still in the bankrupt's possession, or at least in
his control.
41 The restrictions imposed by Maggio may be easily circumvented; in the event
that the evidence does not indicate the bankrupt's present possession of the missing
assets, he may be ordered to explain their loss, instead of being ordered to produce
them.
42
See Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147 (1923) ; Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923);
Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913); In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911);
cf. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MwN. L. REv. 1, 36 (1949),
which concludes that "[i]t must, then, be taken as settled that the federal constitutional privilege does not protect an individual from producing in response to subpoena
...
a writing of which he is not entitled to possession in his capacity as an individual."
43The privilege cannot shield the bankrupt from the compulsory production of
his assets or of his books and papers since he loses title to them by operation of law
as soon as a petition is filed. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. 110(a) (1964);
see, e.g., Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923) ; Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S.
457, 458-59 (1913) ; In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1911).
This exception to the privilege can be especially hazardous for the debtor against
whom an involuntary petition has been filed, for even if he contests the petition, he
cannot avoid the production of his books and papers for inspection:
It may be that the allegation of bankruptcy will not be sustained, and in that
case, the alleged bankrupt will be entitled to a return of his property including his books and papers; and when they are returned, he may refuse to
produce them and stand on his constitutional rights. But while they are, in
the due course of the bankruptcy proceedings, taken out of his possession and
control, his immunity from producing them, secured him under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, does not enure to his protection.
Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 150 (1923). Consequently, an act of bankruptcy is not
a prerequisite to the application of this exception. Merely by being in debt, an individual may find that when an involuntary petition is filed against him, regardless of
its merit, the fifth amendment cannot protect the privacy of his books and papers.
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no distinction between records of the bankrupt's business affairs and
papers of a personal nature; so long as they relate to his property, all
are subject to a turn-over order.4 4 In the words of Mr. Justice Holmes,
"[t]hat is one of the misfortunes of bankruptcy if it follows crime. The
right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself is not a right
to appropriate property that may tell one's story." ' It is unlikely that
the bankrupt could successfully extricate himself from this dilemma
without suffering substantial injury. Destruction of incriminating
portions of records or concealment of illegally acquired assets in response to a turn-over order would invite prosecution, as well as risk
denial of discharge." The bankrupt could not avoid the risk of subsequent prosecution by transferring possession to the trustee on condition that the books and papers be used exclusively in the bankruptcy
proceeding; such a condition would be unenforceable, and could not
prevent the trustee's compliance with a subpoena requiring production
for the purpose of a subsequent prosecution.4 7

In the context of a bankruptcy proceeding it is difficult to justify
this exception to the privilege against self-incrimination. Admittedly,
the books and papers of the bankrupt may be vitally important to his
creditors, but that does not make them "quasi-public" records. Unlike
a person who engages in a business in which the keeping of records
for periodic official inspection is an obligation imposed by law, the
bankrupt may have no notice before insolvency that the keeping of
records will be required of him, or that his records may be used as
evidence against him. Because of this limitation on the privilege, the
existence of a fundamental constitutional right is dependent on the
uncertain fortunes of business and commerce: while the books and
papers of the unsuccessful businessman can provide evidence that might
deprive him of his liberty, the business records of his successful-but
not necessarily more honest--counterpart cannot be so used. Such a
restriction of the privilege may be unsound in any circumstances; 48 it
44 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1) (1964). The phrase
"documents relating to his property" is limited in scope only by the nature and extent
of the bankrupt's non-exempt assets because the bankrupt loses title only to those
documents relating to the property that passes to his trustee. 4A W. CoLmER,
BANKRUPTCY § 70.10, at 112 (14th ed. 1967). As to a document relating to both
exempt and non-exempt property, however, it is likely that it, too, would pass to the
trustee and lose the protection of the privilege.
45 It re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1911).
4
6See Bankruptcy Act § 14(a) (2), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (2) (1964); 18 U.S.C.

§ 152 (1964).
47 See Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923).
48
In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), the Supreme Court held
that for the purpose of determining standing to challenge the admission of evidence,
the scope of constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure cannot
be dependent on "subtle distinctions" of property law. Id. at 266. Also, in Matthews
v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1943), the court rejected the government's contention that the bankrupt had no standing to challenge the admission of improperly
seized evidence because she had lost title to it by operation of the bankruptcy law.
The bankrupt's possessory interest was sufficient, the court held, for the personal
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is based not on constitutional or evidentiary principles, but merely on
the technical and automatic passing of title from the bankrupt to the
appointed trustee of his estate.
The most serious consequence of the bankrupt's invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination is the denial of discharge from
indebtedness.49 Ultimately, it may be a more severe penalty than imprisonment for contempt because denial of discharge is a permanent
sanction. Moreover, its application is more immediate because a referee
in bankruptcy is empowered to bar discharge,"0 while he may only cite,
but cannot commit, the bankrupt for contempt. 5 The severity of this
penalty involves much more than a mere refusal to release the bankrupt
from his debts; it is not simply a matter of depriving him of a windfall,
without which he would have been no worse off. He loses much, if
not all of his income producing property when he is adjudicated a bankrupt, and none of it is returned if discharge is denied. As a result he
forfeits the means of raising funds necessary to satisfy those debts outstanding after the distribution of his estate. To be sure, even when
discharge is denied, the bankrupt is not entirely uncompensated for the
loss of his property, since his assets are applied to the reduction of his
debt. But that is scant consolation to the debtor from whom the principle compensation of the Bankruptcy Act is withheld; it is far better
to have a business or other valuable properties subject to debts than
to possess little or no property at all, while remaining deeply in debt.
In short, denial of discharge reduces the bankrupt to a financial plight
considerably more desperate than his position prior to the initiation of
protection of the fourth amendment to apply. Id. at 537. Since the purpose of the
fourth and fifth amendments is to protect the individual-and not merely his property
-the analogy to the privilege against self-incrimination is powerful: even though title
has passed to his trustee, surely the bankrupt's continued possession of his books and
papers ought to permit his non-disclosure of incriminating information contained in
them. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), where the Court, speaking
of the relationship between the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure and the fifth amendment privilege, said that in this respect "the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." Id. at 630. See also
Comment, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65

CoLum. L. R v. 681, 686 (1965).

49
The bankrupt's claim of privilege in refusing to answer a material question
approved by the court has been held to constitute grounds for denial of discharge, as

authorized by § 14(c) (6), of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (6) (1964).

See Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210, 211 (4th Cir. 1949) ; In re Kolb, 151 F.2d
605 (2d Cir. 1945); In re Dresser, 146 F. 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1906); In re Zaidins,
182 F. Supp. 543 (ED. Wis. 1960); In re Bauknight, 14 F.2d 674 (S.D. Fla. 1926).
Since section 14(c) (6) does not specifically require denial of discharge for the bankrupt's invocation of the privilege, it might seem that imposition of this penalty would
be at the discretion of the referee. At least one referee, however, has indicated that
discharge is automatically barred in these circumstances: "The bankrupt must choose
between his privilege and his discharge. If he elects to exercise his privilege, he
thereby automatically elects to waive his discharge." J. Strasheim (Referee in
Bankruptcy, D. Neb.), Conducting Hearings and Examinations, PROCEEDINGS FOR
FOURTH SEMINAR FOR REFEREES rx BANKRUPTCY 371, 384 (1967).

50 Bankruptcy Act §38(4), 11 U.S.C. § 66(4) (1964).
51Id. §38(2), 11 U.S.C. §66(2).
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the proceeding. It is, therefore, the principle means of compulsion
available to his creditors to force compliance with the disclosure requirements of the Bankruptcy Act.
Denial of discharge is nevertheless defended as a reasonable and
proper response when the bankrupt seeks to justify non-disclosure on
the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. With respect to
the voluntary bankrupt, it is argued that the penalty is a risk freely
undertaken; that is, since he sought the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act,
the voluntary bankrupt should not then complain of the obligation of
full disclosure imposed on him in return. 2 This freedom-of-choice
argument rests on the assumption that anyone who files a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy does so of his own free will, waiving by implication the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 The assumption is
In most cases the decision to enter
no more than superficially valid.'
bankruptcy voluntarily is forced by the circumstances of insolvency. 5
It is unrealistic to isolate the act of filing a petition in bankruptcy by
separating it from the condition of insolvency, for the former is no
more a willful act than is the latter a matter of choice.5 5 If, for example, a debtor is pressed by a particular creditor to make a preferential
payment, he may be compelled to file a voluntary petition in order to
insure equitable treatment for all of his creditors.
The inference of conscious waiver of the privilege in bankruptcy
also fails to withstand analysis. To be sure, if the voluntary bankrupt
had committed a bankruptcy crime-an offense which he ought to
expect will be the subject of inquiry by his creditors-then waiver
might reasonably be presumed. But a theory of conscious waiver is
certainly less warranted in the case of a bankrupt whose offenses are
independent of bankruptcy, and who may not have expected them to
52
See Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949); it. re Bauknight,
14 F.2d 674 (D. Fla. 1926).

This is analogous to the argument that one who engages in illegal activities
for which registration is required waives the privilege by implication. In Marchetti
v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), this argument was expressly rejected by the
Supreme Court. Id. at 51.
54For the involuntary bankrupt, of course, the argument is completely inapplicable, especially when he contests the petition filed against him. In that case, the
statutory benefit is neither desired nor sought, yet its concurrent obligations and
conditions are nevertheless imposed.

55 While there are exceptions, it cannot be presumed that all bankrupts willfully
bring about their own financial failure.

56 It might be useful to draw an analogy to the application for public relief. Here,
too, the filing of the application is, in a sense, an exercise of "free will." In the
circumstances of poverty, however, in which the only alternative may be destitution,
few would question the compulsion attendant upon that choice. When economic
duress (as opposed to the desire for profit) is a major factor motivating the application for a government benefit, as it is in bankruptcy, the imposition of a condition
limiting the enjoyment of a constitutional right has been held to be impermissible in
some cases. See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1595 (1960).
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come within the scope of examination. Here, where the consequences
of choice are uncertain, its legal significance is substantially diminished. 7
Even if the decision to enter bankruptcy were not dictated by the
circumstances of insolvency, however, and waiver could reasonably be
inferred, the freedom-of-choice argument would still raise serious
problems. It would require, of course, that the debtor forego the
benefit of a discharge in bankruptcy if he wishes to avoid compelled
incriminationYs While such a result may be appropriate in dealing
with the dishonest debtor, it involves harsh and undeserved consequences for his creditors. Since the debtor would be discouraged from
filing a petition of voluntary bankruptcy, his creditors would be denied
the benefits of bankruptcy unless they would be willing to initiate an
involuntary proceeding. Such alternative action by the creditors may
not be feasible. Besides the substantial pleading and discovery problems which they must overcome in order to prevail," they may not
wish to incur the added expense, especially when the debtor demands a
jury trial. ° Involuntary bankruptcy involves not only the cost of an
additional proceeding prior to adjudication, but also the possibility that
the debtor's assets may be further dissipated while the proceeding is
in progress."'
It is more convincingly argued that the discharge of a bankrupt
from his debts is not a fundamental right, but a privilege created by
Congress, subject to whatever reasonable conditions Congress may
impose. 2 This consideration cannot be dismissed lightly. The Bank67 Cf. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup. CT. REv.
103, 132 (P. Kurland ed. 1966). Speaking in the context of a self-reporting or
registration requirement enacted subsequent to the commission of a crime, or during
the commission of a continuing offense (such as membership in a subversive organization), Professor Mansfield suggests that criminal liability for the secondary offense of
failing to report or to register should not be imposed, since the obligation of compelled
self-incrimination was not a factor of the primary crime at the time of its commission. The same consideration is applicable in the context of bankruptcy when, prior
to becoming insolvent, the bankrupt had committed an independent offense which he
had no reason to believe he would be required to report, either by his own testimony
or by the surrender of his books and papers for investigation.
58 From a broader point of view, a considerably more serious deprivation might
be involved-the inability to engage in any commercial activity, either personal purchasing or business financing-that might lead to bankruptcy. On its face, the conclusion seems extreme, but its applicability, at least to the involuntary bankrupt, is
apparent. While this would not constitute the restriction of a fundamental freedom,
such as the right to travel, its severity is analogus to that of the deprivation implied
in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), which, as Professor Mansfield points
out, was "the abandonment of the wholesale grocery business." Mansfield, supra
note 57, at 145.
69 See generally Trost, suPra note 11.
'0 Bankruptcy Act § 19(a), 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) (1964).
01 See Feibelman, What's Wrong with the Bankruptcy Law?, 71 Com. LJ. 134
(1966)2 (quoting remarks of Alexander L. Puskay, Referee in Bankruptcy).
6 See, e.g., In re Zidoff, 309 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1962); Kaufman v. Hurwitz,
176 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1949) ; Dixwell v. Scott, 115 F.2d 873 (1st Cir. 1940) ; it re
Dresser, 146 F. 383, 385 (2d Cir. 1906) ; In re Peters, 266 F. Supp. 742 (D. Utah
1967) ; lit re Solari Furs, 263 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Mo. 1967) ; I. re Wright, 247
F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mo. 1965) ; In re Zaidins, 182 F. Supp. (E.D. Wis. 1960) ; In re
Stone, 172 F. Supp. 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Yaeger, 28 F. Supp. 117 (W.D.N.Y.

1939).
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ruptcy Act was not designed, has not been construed, and should not
be altered to confer its benefits on all bankrupts, regardless of their dishonesty or their unwillingness to cooperate in its administration.63
But the question that must be raised is not whether Congress may
impose reasonable conditions on the grant of a discharge in bankruptcy. 4 Even if that is answered in the affirmative, the more fundamental question remains: whether Congress can require, as one of
its conditions, waiver of the constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.6 5
III. WAIVER AS A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
This issue has reached the Supreme Court, albeit in different circumstances, in the cases of Garrity v. New Jersey 6 and Spevack v.
Klein.67 In Garrity,two policemen under investigation had waived the
privilege against self-incrimination on threat of discharge from the
police force and made disclosures which the state then used to secure
their conviction. The Court reversed the conviction and held that
because the disclosures had been compelled, they were inadmissible in
the subsequent prosecution. The majority opinion of Justice Douglas
emphasized the severity of the threatened deprivation, which was comAs the court noted in Kaufman v. Hurwitz, 176 F.2d 210, 211 (4th Cir. 1949);
If it should be held that the claim of privilege against self incrimination
constitutes a justification for failure to keep records and to explain the deficiency of assets to meet liabilities, the way would be open for a bankrupt
to obtain the privileges of the statute without providing the assurance that
all of his assets will be applied to the satisfaction of his debts; and Congress
could not have intended this result.
64 See Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAv. L. Rtv. 1595 (1960), where
it is suggested that there are two legitimate interests which may justify the restriction
of a constitutional right as a condition imposed on the grant of a government benefit:
First is the interest in ensuring that the benefit or facility extended is maintained for the purposes intended, in order to protect the effectiveness of the
benefit itself. Second, social interests must be protected against those whose
capacity for inflicting harm is increased by possession of the benefit.
Id. at 1600 (footnotes omitted). Both of these interests are applicable to bankruptcy.
Indeed, it is arguable that the bankrupt's capacity for inflicting harm, in terms of
"sticking" future creditors, would be decreased if the "benefit!' of discharge were
received. Once discharged, he will be considerably less capable of running heavily
into debt, for it is unlikely that he will be able to obtain credit readily. Therefore,
as soon as knowledge of the fate of prior creditors is circulated, the bankrupt should
become less of a potential menace for future creditors.
03

6 In this context, a distinction should be made between the imposition of a condition on an individual and its application to a corporate or other commercial entity.
There may be compelling reasons for a state to restrict constitutional guarantees as
they apply to a non-resident business organization. See generally Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoIum. L. Rxv. 321 (1935).
But
entirely different factors ought to be considered in the case of an individual, such as his
relative weakness, his inability to forego the benefit offered, and his inability to adopt
effective alternatives. In short, the level at which economic duress becomes oppressive
may be far lower for an individual than it is for a large business.
06385 U.S. 493 (1967).

67385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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He concluded that under the cirpared to forfeiture of property."'
cumstances, the privilege had not been freely waived: "We think the
statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of
questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior
decisions." '
In Spevack, a lawyer had been disbarred when he refused to
testify or produce his financial records during an investigation of unethical conduct. The Court reversed the disbarment, holding that the
lawyer could not be deprived of his professional livelihood as a penalty
for exercising the privilege to remain silent. Announcing the judg-

ment of the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas again referred primarily to the
severity of the pressure exerted to induce waiver of the privilege.
Apparently believing that the substantial state interest involved in
both cases was not a controlling consideration, he concluded that the
protection extended by the privilege could not be diluted by allowing
imposition of a non-criminal penalty: "In this context 'penalty' is not
restricted to fine or imprisonment.

It means . . . the imposition of

any sanction which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
'costly.' "I
Although the concurring opinion of Justice Fortas in
Spevack (which was necessary to form a plurality in that case and a
majority in Garrity) differs in a number of respects from the interpretation of the privilege expressed by Justice Douglas, there is
no discrepancy in their treatment of the privilege when no immunity
from prosecution is extended. They agree that in those circumstances
the state may neither coerce a waiver of immunity nor punish a refusal
to waive."1
0s The New Jersey statute involved in this case, 49 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 69A-167
(1967), which required forfeiture of a public employee's job for his invocation of
the privilege, is compared to a federal forfeiture of property statute condemned in
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see note 48 supra. 385 U.S. at 497-98.
Mr. Justice Douglas cites Boyd not merely as an analogy, but as controlling
precedent for his opinions in Garrity and Spevack. Id. In at least one respect, his
citation is open to question, for the penalty imposed on the privilege in Boyd, a civil
forfeiture of property, was specifically found by the Court to be a sanction criminal in
nature, 116 U.S. at 633-34. It was for this reason-and not because of its coercive
effect-that the penalty was held unconstitutional. In Garrity and Spevack, on the
other hand, the opinions of Mr. justice Douglas, in contrast to the concurring opinion
of Mr. justice Fortas in the latter case, seem strongly to imply that even non-criminal
consequences may not be threatened to induce waiver of the privilege, or imposed to
punish its invocation. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text. Unless it could
be argued that the petitioners in those cases had proprietary interests in employment
as a policeman or a lawyer, which is unlikely considering that neither was under
contract of employment, the crucial factor in Boyd is absent in Garrity and Spevack:
deprivation of one's livelihood may be a severe penalty, but at least in these circumstances, it is not a criminal penalty.
69 385 U.S. at 497-98.
70 Id. at 515 (citation omitted).
71 Standing alone, Garrity could not compel this result, for as Justice Douglas
noted in Spevack, 385 U.S. at 516 n.3, the Garrity case did not pose the question
whether, in the absence of immunity, the policemen could have been fired had they
invoked the privilege and refused to testify. In Spevack, however, that question did
reach the Court, although in modified form. There, the petitioner did not permit the
threat of disbarment to undermine his resolve to refuse disclosure, and the Supreme
Court's response-both in the plurality and concurring opinions-was to hold that
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Considering the inadequacies of the limited testimonial immunity

available in bankruptcy, 72 the principle established in Garrity and

Spevack would appear to be clearly applicable to the bankrupt's invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. 3 Denial of discharge is
as severe a penalty as the deprivation threatened in Garrity or the
sanction imposed in Spevack.74 The bankrupt is given the choice
either of offering testimony which could convict him in a later prosecution, or of suffering a substantial financial loss. This is the same kind
of pressure 5 which the Court held to be unconstitutional. Waiver of
the privilege in these circumstances would no more satisfy the standards
of voluntariness than it did in Garrity; without immunity the bankrupt's refusal to incriminate himself would no more justify denial of
discharge than did the lawyer's refusal permit disbarment in Spevack.
It is not suggested that the circumstances are entirely indistinguishable. In the first place, the denial of discharge in bankruptcy
involves the withholding of a benefit before its enjoyment, while in
Spevack and Garrity benefits had been withdrawn after enjoyment.
Presumably one is penalized more by having a benefit that is already
being enjoyed withdrawn than by being denied a benefit one
has never enjoyed in the first place. In bankruptcy, however, this
distinction is not dispositive, because a denial of discharge is a very
real penalty, even if not previously enjoyed by petitioner.7 6 It must be
assumed that in most cases, the benefit of discharge is sought because
disbarment was an impermissible penalization of the fifth amendment privilege. Had
the circumstances of Garrity been identical, the same result may reasonably be inferred,
for the different treatment of a lawyer and a policeman suggested by Justice Fortas
was not intended to apply unless immunity was conferred on their testimony. See
notes 84-90 infra and accompanying text.
7
2 See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
"tSee King, Constitutional Rights and the Bankruptcy Act, 72 Com. L.J. 315,
316 (1967), where some of the distinctions between bankruptcy and Garrity and
Spevack are briefly noted, but rejected as not controlling.
74 See text following note 49 vtpra.
7 There is little dispute that the threat of denial of discharge is compulsive in
effect. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 512 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76 In some cases this distinction might be controlling. If, for example, an applicant for government employment were to invoke the privilege in response to a question
directly bearing on his qualifications for the position sought, rejection of his application
would probably be justified. Since the individual had not been a government employee
prior to the request for incriminating information, there would be no deprivation of
a previously enjoyed benefit; therefore, denial of employment would not constitute a
"penalization" of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Citing Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1952), where the Court upheld the denial
of a military commission to a physician who had invoked the privilege against selfincrimination in response to inquiry concerning his affiliation with the Communist Party,
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Spevack, maintains that "it is permissible to
deny a status or authority to a claimant of the privilege. .. if his claim has prevented
full assessment of his qualifications for the status or authority." 385 U.S. at 525-26.
However, his endorsement of this principle is grounded not on the distinction between
the withholding of a governmental benefit before enjoyment and its withdrawal after
enjoyment, but rather, on a consideration, in each individual case, of the relative
importance of disclosure of the privileged information, on the one hand, and the
protective function of the fifth amendment privilege, on the other. Id. at 525.
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relief is needed. Even in the case of a voluntary bankrupt, there may
be no real freedom to avoid seeking relief." Moreover, the bankrupt
must substantially change his position in anticipation of the benefit
offered by the statute. He must give up title to all of his non-exempt
property before his request for a discharge can be considered. Hence,
if discharge is denied, the bankrupt remains under the burden of debt
and may wel be in worse shape than if he had not filed in the first
place."
Secondly, in contrast to the investigations in Garrityand Spevack,
a proceeding in bankrupty is initiated and conducted by private parties,
not by the government. However, this distinction should have no
bearing on the issue of compelled waiver of the privilege against selfincrimination. In other civil proceedings involving private parties,
such as a suit in tort, the defendant's invocation of the privilege might
be considered in reaching a judgment, but it could not of itself be
conclusive. In the tort context, liability is not a penalty imposed on
the defendant because of his claim of privilege. It is the result of his
failure to respond effectively to the case established against him." In
bankruptcy, on the other hand, the consequences attached to the
privilege are quite different, both in nature and in effect. Imposed by
statute, they are not only conclusive, but flow directly from the claim
of privilege itself. Denial of discharge is clearly in the nature of a
penalty because it is authorized whenever the bankrupt fails to respond
77

See text accompanying note 54 mipra.
78 It is this aspect of the bankrupt's position which presents the most serious
objections to the position maintained by Mr. Justice Harlan in his Spevack dissent,
cited at note 76 mpra. In the case of the individual seeking government employment,
for example, it might legitimately be asserted that "the applicant may not both decline
to disclose information necessary to demonstrate his fitness, and yet demand that he
receive the benefits of the status. He may not by his interjection of the privilege
either diminish his obligation to establish his qualifications, or escape the consequences
exacted by the State for a failure to satisfy that obligation." 385 U.S. at 526
(Harlan, J., dissenting). Yet the point is that in such a case "the consequences
exacted by the State!' are merely the denial of the application for government employment. Assuming that the agency conducting the employment interview would not
publicize the applicant's invocation of the privilege, it might be said that he would
have suffered no substantial loss, either fiancially or in terms of his reputation, by his
claim of privilege. In bankruptcy, however, "the consequence exacted by the state" is
not merely an analogous refusal to release the bankrupt from the burden of his debts,
for he is not returned to his position prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
If that were the case, the extension of Mr. Justice Harlan's argument to the circumstances of bankruptcy, which is done in his Spevack dissent, id. at 527, might be
persuasive. But so long as denial of discharge places the bankrupt in a substantially
worse position than his status prior to bankruptcy, it must be concluded that what is
involved here is an impermissible consequence exacted by the State.
79 It should be noted, however, that some jurisdictions permit the trier of fact
to draw an unfavorable inference from the invocation of the privilege by a civil
litigant, see, e.g., Ikeda v. Curtis, 43 Wash. 2d 449, 261 P.2d 684 (1953),
though his silence alone will usually not justify an adverse finding. Generally,
the direct consequences attached to the privilege in civil suits are evidentiary restrictions, such as the striking of portions of the claimant's direct testimony when the
privilege thwarts effective cross-examination. See generally Note, Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimintion in Civil Litigation, 52 VA. L. REv. 322 (1966) ; 27
TEMPLE L.Q. 366 (1954).
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to a question concerning his assets; ° it is not restricted to cases in
which the privilege is invoked after creditors have established that
the bankrupt's prior activities would themselves justify denial of
discharge."
Thirdly, it might be argued that the nature of a bankruptcy discharge differs so substantially from the benefit of government employment or a state-conferred license that enjoyment of the former legitimately entails more burdensome obligations. That may be true, but
it does not shake the holdings of Garrity and Spevack. In the limited
context in which no immunity is granted, those cases did not turn on
the legitimacy of constitutional conditions attached to benefits conferred
by government. On the contrary, in the concurring opinion, as well
as those of Justice Douglas, the Court disregarded the special duties
inherent in the positions of the petitioners to hold that without im82
munity, penalization of the exercise of the privilege is impermissible.
It is difficult to see how such penalization in bankruptcy proceedings
could survive a constitutional challenge.
Compelling a discharge in spite of petitioner's refusal to answer
questions on the grounds of self-incrimination would eliminate most
80 Bankruptcy Act § 14(c) (6), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (6) (1964).
The bankrupt
cannot even rely on the requirement of materiality to restrict the scope of inquiry.
The answer to a question which is itself material may require the disclosure of information that is both incriminating and of no value to his creditors. For example,
if the missing assets to which the inquiry is directed have been irretrievably lost by
the bankrupt in illegal activities not amounting to bankruptcy crime, disclosure would
explain their loss, but it could not retrieve the property sought. In these circumstances, the requirement of materiality would not prevent the compelled disclosure
of immaterial, but incriminating evidence.
81 In this sense, denial of discharge may be an arbitrary sanction, since unsupported
by a finding that the bankrupt did, in fact, commit any of the specific offenses for
which it is authorized. Even if it could be said that resort to the privilege properly
raises an inference of the commission of bankruptcy crime, see note 79 supra, this
alone hardly seems to satisfy the requirement that "the court shall grant the discharge
unless satisfied that the bankrupt has (1) committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as provided under Section 152 of Title 18 .

.

.

."

Bankruptcy Act

§ 14(c) (1), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (1) (1964). Once the bankrupt's creditors have established a clear basis for believing that he has committed bankruptcy crime, the burden
of proof shifts to the bankrupt. But if a prima facie case has not been made by those
objecting to discharge, there seems to be no justification for drawing an ultimately
controlling inference from the bankrupt's invocation of the privilege.
Moreover, such indiscriminate penalization of the privilege may involve due
process complications. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956), where the Court held unconstitutional the application of a New York City
ordinance providing that when a city employee invokes the privilege in refusing to
answer a question related to his public conduct, he shall be fired automatically. In
the circumstances of this case, said Mr. Justice Clark, the presumption of guilt which
the ordinance attached to the privilege violated the fourteenth amendment requirement
of due process, since it permitted summary dismissal-in this case from a college
faculty-without any finding that the claimant of the privilege had, in fact, engaged
in conduct inconsistent with the responsibilities attached to his office. Id. at 557-58.
82While Justice Fortas, concurring in Spevack, dwelt on the special relationship between a policeman and his official employer as the basis for his distinction between the treatment of the privilege in those circumstances, as opposed to its invocation by a lawyer in the circumstances of Spevack, the distinction was limited to cases
in which testimonial immunity is conferred. Id. at 519-20 (Fortas, J., concurring).
See note 71 supra & text accompanying notes 84-90 infra.
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of the dangers to which the bankrupt is subjected. But from the point
of view of creditors, this result is decidedly unwelcome. If the creditors
are unable to compel disclosure of material information which is incriminating, the extent of creditor recovery may be substantially reduced. Moreover, if discharge cannot be denied because of the bankrupt's claim of privilege, those debts remaining after the distribution
of his non-exempt property will be cancelled unless creditors succeed in
establishing alternate grounds to bar discharge. It might be argued
that creditors ought not complain of such a result; that in order to
recover they should be required, just as plaintiffs are in other civil
suits, to prove their case against the bankrupt without demanding his
aid in their behalf. This position cannot be accepted, however, because
it fails to comprehend the unique character of a bankruptcy proceeding.
Although it is an involuntary proceeding, it is designed to benefit both
the bankrupt and his creditors. Unlike most other civil suits, bankruptcy is not an adversary proceeding, but one which requires the
active cooperation of all parties if it is to function properly. Indeed,
it would be anomalous to permit the bankrupt to oppose the efforts
of his creditors and at the same time allow him to enjoy a discharge
gained without his cooperation. Consequently, if creditor interests are
to be protected adequately, the bankrupt's disclosure of material information must continue to be compelled.
IV. THFE CONSTITUTIONAL IMMUNITY REQUIREMENT

How this is to be accomplished within the framework of Garrity
and Spevack is not entirely clear. Mr. Justice Douglas's majority
opinion in Garrity and his plurality opinion in Spevack suggest that
whenever the fifth amendment privilege is available, the right to
remain silent is absolute and inviolate, regardless of the circumstances
in which incriminating testimony is sought. This is consistent with
the broad interpretation of the privilege expressed by Mr. Justice
Douglas in other cases, where he has insisted that no immunity is
sufficiently co-extensive with the scope of the privilege unless the witness is insulated from all the consequences of an incriminating disclosure."
Even if complete immunity from prosecution had been
conferred in Garrity and Spevack, therefore, the likelihood that incriminating disclosures would result in disbarment or discharge from
the police force would probably lead him to conclude that neither
penalty could have been imposed on the petitioners for their silence.
With regard to the lawyer in Spevack, the concurring opinion by
Justice Fortas (which, as mentioned earlier, was necessary to form
a plurality in that case and a majority in Garrity) appears to indorse
the expansive view of the privilege against self-incrimination held by
Justice Douglas. Emphasizing that a lawyer is not a state employee,
83See, e.g., Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in Ullman v. United States,
350 U.S. 422, 440-55, discussed at note 98 infra.
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the concurrence maintains that "[t]he special responsibilities that he
assumes as licensee of the State and officer of the court do not carry
with them a diminution, however limited, of his Fifth Amendment
rights." ' This, however, marks the limit of concurrence, for Justice
Fortas distinguishes the lawyer's relationship with the state from
that of the policeman, indicating that the latter's claim of privilege
could properly have been penalized if immunity had been conferred in
Garrity: "This Court has never held, for example, that a policeman
may not be discharged for refusal in disciplinary proceedings to testify
as to his conduct as a police officer. It is quite a different matter if the
State seeks to use the testimony given under this lash in a subsequent
criminal proceeding." " In contrast to the view of Justice Douglas,
who objects to the use of the "lash" as well as the subsequent prosecutory use of testimony so compelled, the concurrence contends that in
the case of the policeman, the Court's prohibition should apply only
to use of the testimony.
In two later decisions by the Supreme Court, Gardner v. Broderick 86 and Uniformed Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner
8 7
of Sanitation,
both majority opinions were written by Justice Fortas,
and his distinction apparently prevailed."8 In Gardner, a policeman
was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigation of bribery
and corruption of police officers. Refusing to waive immunity from
prosecution, he claimed the fifth amendment privilege, for which
he was dismissed from the police force pursuant to section 1123 of the
New York City Charter. In Sanitation Men, fifteen employees of the
New York City Department of Sanitation were dismissed, pursuant
to the same charter provision, for refusing to waive immunity and
invoking the privilege in an investigation of misappropriation of fees
charged private cartmen for use of city facilities. In both cases the
Court held the dismissals unconstitutional on the ground that a public
employee cannot be fired for his invocation of the privilege against
self-incrimination when he has not been granted immunity.'
To the
extent of their holdings, neither decision advances beyond Garrity or
Spevack. In dictum, however, the Court unequivocally departs from
the implication of Justice Douglas's opinion in Garrity to repeat in
84 385 U.S. at 520.
85Id. at 519-20.
86 392 U.S. 273 (1968).

87 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
88 This is not to suggest that the dicta of Justice Fortas's concurrence in
Spevack were elevated to the status of holdings in Gardner or Sanitation Men; the
facts of the latter cases could not support them as holdings, for just as in Garrity and
Spevack, no immunity was conferred. If the absence of a separate opinion by
Justice Douglas perhaps cannot fairly be accorded significance, that he joined in the
opinions of the Court, rather than registering simple concurrence without opinion
(as did Justice Black) would seem to indicate acquiescence in, if not approval
of, the Fortas dicta.

89 392 U.S. at 278-79; 392 U.S. at 284-85.
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Gardner the distinction made by Justice Fortas in his Spevack
concurrence:
Unlike the lawyer who is directly responsible to his client,
the policeman is either responsible to the State or to no one.
We agree that these factors differentiate the situations.
If appellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions
specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance
of his official duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect to the use of his answers ot the fruits
thereof in a criminal prosecution of himself . . . the priv-

ilege against self-incrimination would not have been a bar to
his dismissal. 0
The Court's deliberate repudiation of the broad implications of
Justice Douglas's Garrity opinion seems to qualify his expansive
interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege in circumstances where
immunity has been granted. The direction taken in Gardner and
SanitationMen appears to follow the traditional view that the privilege
only protects against consequences criminal in nature; non-criminal
penalties for invocation of the privilege are not within its protection."'
In a number of instances the Court's language in Gardner reflects this
position. Speaking of the policemen in that case (who were fired because
they would not sign waivers of immunity) the Court says they were
"dismissed for failure to relinquish the protections of the privilege
against self-incrimination," 92 a statement which might leave the impression that employment tenure is not to be considered within that
protection. Mr. Justice Fortas speaks as if the danger of prosecutory
use of the testimony-the only consequence that could have been eliminated by testimonial immunity-is the exclusive danger against which
the fifth amendment privilege is designed to protect: "The question
presented in the present case is whether a policeman who refuses to
waive the protections which the privilege gives him may be dismissed
from office because of that refusal." 13
In spite of these verbal suggestions, however, it would probably
be a mistake to ascribe this rationale to the Court's treatment of the
privilege. Such an analysis would fail to account for Justice Fortas's
distinction between a policeman and a lawyer. If the Court were of
the opinion that the protection of the privilege disappears once immunity from prosecution were conferred, there would be no greater
reason to permit an immunized lawyer to remain silent than an immunized policeman; assuming that immunity dispels the existence of
the privilege in both cases, the difference between the lawyer's relationship to the state and that of the policeman would no longer be a rele90 392 U.S. at 277-78 (footnotes & citation omitted).
91
See, e.g., 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2255, 2281 (3d ed. 1961).
92392 U.S. at 278.

93 Id.at 276.
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vant distinction. A more likely reading of Justice Fortas's position
is probably that a grant of immunity from prosecution will limit the
scope of the privilege in those circumstances in which the state needs
incriminating information and the witness, because of his relation to
the state, has an independent duty to disclose it. In these circumstances, the witness would not be protected from non-criminal sanctions
for failure to answer.
Whether such a rule would be applicable if a sufficient degree of
immunity were extended in bankruptcy must depend, therefore, on
whether the position of the bankrupt with respect to the government
is closer to the public employees in Garrity, Gardner and Sanitation
Men or to that of the lawyer in Spevack. To use the terminology of
Justice Fortas in Spevack, the question is whether "[t]he special
responsibilities that [the bankrupt] assumes" when he seeks the benefits of the Bankruptcy Act "carry with them a diminution, however
limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights." " Of the petitioner in that
case, for whom the conclusion was, by inference, in the negative,
Justice Fortas said that "[h]is responsibility to the State is to obey
its laws and the rules of conduct that it has generally laid down as part
of its licensing procedures." '- It seems clear that something more
should be required of the bankrupt. In this context, with immunity
available to the bankrupt, the nature of the benefit he seeks indeed becomes relevant. The relief sought is an extraordinary dispensation
from the application of the laws of the state. The benefit conferred
is greater than a mere permit to practice a profession. It is more
closely analogous to the benefit conferred by the state on its employees. Therefore, the bankrupt should be held to assume "special
responsibilities" greater than that of the attorney and approaching
those of state employees. It is appropriate that the bankrupt be required to make a complete accounting to his creditors, the individuals
whose own interests are infringed by that dispensation, for, to borrow
8 as a policeman "is either
the words of Justice Fortas in Gardner,"
responsible to the State or to no one," the bankrupt is either responsible
to his creditors or to no one.
While the bankrupt's failure to cooperate after the grant of more
extensive immunity can be adequately dealt with, his willingness to
cooperate would then raise a difficult problem. If the bankrupt, testifying under the compulsion of immunity and the permissible threat of
denial of discharge for non-disclosure, reveals his commission of a bankruptcy crime, may discharge be denied? The policy of the Bankruptcy
Act with respect to dishonest debtors would certainly seem to require
that result, but its constitutionality is not entirely free from doubt. 7
94
9 385 U.S. at 520.
5 Id.
96 392 U.S. at 278.
97 In order to meet constitutional standards, the protection afforded by immunity
must be "co-extensive" with that guaranteed by the privilege being infringed. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See note 33 supra.
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The traditional view is that the privilege protects only against
consequences criminal in nature: once the possibility of prosecution is
removed, the privilege disappears and cannot be invoked to prevent noncriminal consequences, such as loss of employment or public opprobrium,
from following an incriminating disclosure. This position has been
endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court, at least by implication,
even with respect to such penalties that are imposed by operation of
law.
It is not inconsistent with the principle of Garrity and Spevack,
although the Court condemned the use of non-criminal penalties, to
induce waiver of the privilege and to punish its invocation, because
immunity
had not been extended to the petitioners in either of those
9
cases.

The prevailing interpretation with respect to the requirements of
co-extensive protection, however, offers a satisfactory resolution only
98
1n Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), the constitutionality of a
federal immunity statute was challenged on the grounds that
the impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities and the
public in general-such as loss of job, expulsion from labor unions, state
registration and investigation statutes, passport eligibility, and general public
opprobrium-is so oppressive that the statute does not give [the witness] true
immunity.
Id. at 430. Delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter specifically
rejected this argument:
[A]s this Court has often held, the immunity granted need only remove those
sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation of the privilege: "The
interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked
to incriminate himself-in other words, to give testimony which may possibly
expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been
taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply."
Id. at 430-31 (quoting Hale v. Hinkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906)). See also 8 J. WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§2255, 2281 (3d ed. 1961).
It should be emphasized that Mr. Justice Frankfurter made no distinction between
non-legal disabilities which result from the actions of private individuals, such as
loss of job and "general public opprobrium," 350 U.S. at 430, and consequences imposed or authorized by operation of law, such as the application of state registration
requirements or the possibility of passport restrictions. Id. At least with regard to
the former, it seems clear that the traditional view of the privilege could not permit
such private consequences to come within its scope. Otherwise, immunity of any
kind would be effectively abolished as a means of acquiring needed information, for
there are few crimes which would not subject their perpetrators to some degree of
public condemnation. As for the latter category, however, it is arguable that whenever a disability is imposed by operation of law-even one which is clearly noncriminal in nature-it approaches the level of a penal sanction in effect. At least with
regard to duration and enforcement, there is some validity to this observation. With
the passage of time, private parties and the community in general might forget, or at
least forgive; the law can do neither unless it is changed. Moreover, a privately
imposed disability cannot be universally enforced, for the job or other benefit refused
by one individual on the basis of incriminating admissions compelled under a grant of
immunity might be offered by others. If the disability is imposed by law, on the
other hand, especially if it prevents the enjoyment of a benefit which can be conferred only by government, there would be no way to escape its effect. Even Professor Wigmore, who has been characterized as "no particular friend of the privilege,"
McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 209
(P. Kurland ed. 1967), recognizes a distinction between private disabilities and the
"loss of a right . . . inflicted by statute," for in the latter he finds a "greater
semblance of penal policy." 8 J. WIGMoaE, EVIDENCE §2256, at 331 (3d ed. 1961).

99 385 U.S. at 495.
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if the denial of discharge in bankruptcy is not a criminal penalty.'
In effect, the sanction is so much like a forfeiture of goods that it is
arguably penal in nature. On the other hand, those assets which are
lost when discharge is barred would have been subject to the bankrupt's debts even if he had never become a bankrupt. Moreover, since
his non-exempt assets are applied to the reduction of those debts when
discharge is denied, thereby compensating him for the loss of his property, it cannot be said that a criminal deprivation is suffered.
The opposing point of view, which has consistently been the
opinion of a minority of the Supreme Court,'0 ' is that no immunity is
sufficient to supplant the privilege against self-incrimination unless it
protects the witness from all the consequences of an incriminating disclosure, even those which are neither criminal in nature nor imposed
by law. In Garrity, therefore, if the policemen's admissions of serious
misconduct in the performance of their duty had been immunized from
prosecutorial use, as suggested by justice Fortas, it is doubtful that
the Court would have unanimously agreed that they could have been
fired merely on the basis of that admission.0 2 In the same context,
if the bankrupt's immunized testimony reveals the commission of
bankruptcy crime, the minority adhering to this broad interpretation
of the requirements of co-extensive protection would probably be of the
opinion that such disclosure could not be the basis of a denial of
discharge.' 3
100 As a qualification of his remarks in Ullnann, quoted in note 98 supra,
Justice Frankfurter emphasized that "since the Immunity Act protects a witness who
is compelled to answer to the extent of his constitutional immunity, he has of course,
when a particular sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim
that itis criminal in nature." 350 U.S. at 431.
T01 The dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas in Ullianm, in which Mr. Justice Black
concurred, 350 U.S. at 440-55, is an eloquent and detailed statement of the minority
position. Speaking of the privilege against self-incrimination as "the right of silence,"
id. at 449, Mr. Justice Douglas offered the opinion that it "is not only a protection
against conviction and prosecution but a safeguard of conscience and human dignity
and freedom of expression as well." Id. at 445.
While he does not specifically endorse this position, Professor Mansfield discusses it sympathetically, noting that there are "serious misgivings about the consequences other than criminal punishment that may be visited upon a person who is
forced to disclose incriminating information about himself." Mansfield, supra note
57, at 107.
102 Professor McKay endorses the minority position on the ground that it is "an
almost inescapable reading of Spevack, at least concerning the disbarment question."
McKay, Self-Incriminiation and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 231
(P. Kurland ed. 1967). That either Spevack or Garrity requires such a conclusion
is arguable, however, for as pointed out in the text at note 99 supra, the holding
that even a non-criminal penalty may not be imposed on the privilege in the absence
of immunity from prosecutory use of the privileged information does not lead inescapably to a holding that a non-criminal penalty may not be imposed when such
immunity has been extended.
103 This is a qualified conclusion because a question of that nature would not be
involved if the inquiry were properly restricted to the bankrupt's financial activities.
It has been suggested, with regard to this distinction, that the fifth amendment
privilege has been inappropriately characterized as a means of safeguarding first
amendment rights. Cf. Comment, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations of Grants
of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 561, 566-67 (1965).
This distinction seems to have been recognized by justice Fortas in his con-
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When applied to the disclosure of bankruptcy crime, the minority
view has substantial -force. It does not mean that the dishonest bankrupt could never be denied discharge for the commission of bankruptcy
crime. On the contrary, whenever evidence of such an offense is
independently available and introduced by creditors, discharge could
still be barred, as it is now. What would be prohibited is only the
imposition of that sanction when the commission of bankrupty crime
is established by the bankrupt's own testimony, compelled by immunity
and uncorroborated by sufficient independent evidence introduced by
his creditors. In addition, comparatively little would be lost in terms
of the policy of the Bankruptcy Act if increased immunity occasionally
resulted in the discharge of an undeserving bankrupt. Without extended immunity, it might be constitutionally impossible to deny discharge to the bankrupt whose claim of privilege blocks the only source
of evidence indicating his commission of bankruptcy crime. The only
effect of increased immunity, therefore, would be to permit the disclosure of information that otherwise would have been suppressed. In
neither case could discharge be denied; increased immunity, however,
would substantially counteract the bankrupt's undeserved enjoyment of
that benefit by ensuring disclosures vital to complete creditor recovery.
The adoption of a greater degree of immunity in bankruptcy is
not a novel suggestion. The need was recognized by Professor
Wigmore, 1 4 and noted by the Supreme Court in a decision holding
the privilege available to the bankrupt in the creditor examination. 0 5
The remedy suggested by the Court, which Congress recently adopted
in the context of a prosecution for bankruptcy crime,106 was complete
immunity-a prohibition against subsequent prosecution of the bankrupt for any offense to which the immunized testimony related. 0 7 At
the time of the Court's decision immunization of the disclosed offense
curring opinion to Spevack, where he carefully characterized the kind of questions he
would permit under a grant of immunity as those "specifically, directly, and narrowly
relating to the performance of . . . official duties." Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511,
519 (1967) (Fortas. J., concurring).
04
- See note 33 supra.
05
'
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924).
106 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§ 2514, 82 Stat. 197, quoted in note 35 supra.
107 If Congress should hereafter conclude that a full disclosure of the bankrupt
estate by the witnesses is of greater importance than the possibility of punishing them
for some crime in the past, substantial and possibly controlling distinction can be
drawn between the circumstances of bankruptcy or the factors in Garrity and Spevack
on the one hand, and those involved in Ulnann on the other. In the latter case, as
Mr. Justice Douglas emphasized in his dissenting opinion, 350 U.S. at 440-55, the
petitioner had been convicted of contempt and sentenced to prison for his refusal
to answer questions concerning his participation and membership in the Communist
Party. Manifestly, these were not ordinary criminal activities; they came close to the
borders of first amendment protection, and it could be said with some justification
that any penalization of such activities raises serious questions of the rights of
citizenship. See id. at 446 n.2. In bankruptcy, however, as in other cases, Congress
confers the power of unrestricted examination by providing complete immunity. Id.

at 442.
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was thought to be the only permissible substitute for the privilege."' 8
Complete immunity is not an appropriate solution, however; since one
of the implicit policies of the Bankruptcy Act is to discourage bankruptcy fraud, the outright pardon of such crimes is hardly harmonious
with its purpose.09

It is possible that elimination of the privilege against selfincrimination need no longer be accompanied by the disadvantages of
complete immunity."
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,"" a
witness who had been granted immunity in a state investigation refused
to give testimony revealing incidental violations of federal law because
the state-granted immunity did not prevent federal prosecution. Here,
the Court was faced with a conflict between sovereignties. If the
possibility of incrimination under federal law could prevent the state
from compellirig disclosure, then the usefulness of immunity as a means
of acquiring information necessary for state law enforcement would be
substantially restricted, without preserving any significant interest of
federal law enforcement. To accommodate these conflicting state and
federal interests without prejudice to either," 2 the Court held that
when testimony is compelled by a state grant of immunity, both the
testimony and its fruits must be protected from federal prosecutorial
use. To be co-extensive with the protection provided by the privilege,
the Court reasoned, it is not necessary to prohibit prosecution for the
crime revealed by the immunized testimony; 113 it is necessary only to
prohibit a prosecution in any way based on that testimony. To ensure
the effectiveness of this use-restriction rule, the Court provided that in
the event of a federal prosecution of the disclosed offense, the government must bear the burden of showing that its evidence, if challenged,
derives from an independent, "untainted" source; that is, the prosecu108 This was the product of a dictum in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892), in which the Court noted that "[i]n view of the constitutional provision, a
statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecu-

tion for the offense to which the question relates." Id. at 586.
109 Although compelled disclosure might prevent the success of attempts to evade
the provisions of the Act, it is possible that the elimination of the criminal deterrents
to bankruptcy fraud would make such attempts more attractive. Moreover, a grant
of absolute immunity, covering all of the bankrupt's incriminating disclosures, could
make bankruptcy a haven for crime. Since the examination of the bankrupt is conducted by his creditors, who determine, within broad limits, the scope of inquiry, there
may be no way of preventing disclosure of offenses other than bankruptcy crimes. A
prohibition against the prosecution of such independent offenses could be detrimental
to the public interest. See Comment, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations of
Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 561, 582-83 (1965).
110 The lack of certainty is caused by the failure of the Court's opinion specifically
to overrule the Counselinan dictum quoted in note 108 supra. See McKay, SelfIncrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 229-30 (P. Kurland ed.
1967). The point was raised, however, in a concurring opinion of Justice White, who
rejected the necessity for absolute immunity. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52, 106 (1964) (White, J., concurring).

111378 U.S. 52 (1964).
112 Id. at 79.

113 Id.
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tion must establish that the immunized testimony was in no manner
used to discover its evidence." 4
V.

THE USE-RESTRICTION RULE IN BANKRUPTCY

Use-restriction is a simple and appealing measure, but as yet it
is virtually untested. It has been criticized as unrealistic, even in the
limited dual sovereignty context to which it was first applied. Whether
it is adaptable to the single sovereignty context of bankruptcy is yet
another question.
Considering its mechanics, the use-restriction rule is based, essentially, on the premise that the witness compelled to testify can be guaranteed that his own words will in no way contribute to a criminal
prosecution against him. The premise of this assertion has been
questioned."" It may be argued, first, that by admitting his criminality
and disclosing some of its details, the witness has, at the very least,
increased the possibility of prosecution, if not of conviction. This
would no doubt be true if the witness had been entirely beyond suspicion at the time his testimony was sought. But this argument assumes
that a response of privilege is innocuous. On the contrary, as soon
as the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked, the atmosphere of
innocence is immediately dispelled by the intrusion of some degree of
suspicion."" In a sense, then, the mere request for an incriminating
disclosure in response to which the privilege is claimed increases the
possibility of prosecution as much as disclosure compelled by a userestriction rule. It might be said, secondly, that while the claim of
privilege merely tells the prosecutor that a crime may have been committed, the Murphy rule would tell him what kind of crime it was,
thereby aiding his investigation." 7 This argument may have some
validity in a general inquiry where the privilege is invoked in response
to vague or seemingly innocuous questions. But the argument loses
force when applied to the context of a creditor examination in bankruptcy,"' where the pointed and detailed questions of creditors might
themselves be of as much investigatory value as the bankrupt's answers.
So long as the prosecution observes the requirements of the Murphy
114

Id. at 79 n.18.

115 See, e.g., Wendel, Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendnent Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Lous U.L.J. 327,
370-73 (1966).
In light of his dissent in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), Mr.
justice Douglas' concurrence in Murphy is somewhat surprising. In the earlier case,
he listed "the risk of prosecution" as one of the "mischief[s] against which [the privilege against self-incrimination] seeks to guard." Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
11 Even Mr. justice Douglas has recognized that this is the "price" which must
be paid for exercising the fifth amendment privilege. Id. at 454.
117 See Comment, Self-Incrimination and the States: Restriking the Balance, 73
YALE L.J. 1491, 1494-96 (1964), where this observation is made from the point of
view of the prosecutor who might be forced to bear the burden of proving that his
investigation was not instigated in this manner.
118 The hostile atmosphere of the creditor examination was noted by the Supreme
Court, which characterized it as "inquisitorial" in Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S.
592, 599-600 (1913).
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rule, then, the bankrupt should be adequately protected to the extent
ensured by the privilege against self-incrimination." 9 A greater
measure of protection is unnecessary and undesirable.
The practicality of the use-restriction rule depends also on whether
its application will tend to hinder the government's effort to prosecute
crime. From the point of view of the prosecution, the rule may be
criticized as imposing a substantial obstacle to effective law enforcement. Even if all of the government's evidence had been gathered prior
to the proceeding in which related testimony had been compelled, to
insure that the testimony has not been used, it is possible that the
prosecution would still bear the burden of proving the independent
origin of its evidence, a burden which one court has already interpreted
as requiring "clear and convincing proof." "o Thus, it cannot be said
unequivocally that the task of securing a conviction would, under the
Murphy rule, be no greater than if the compelled testimony had never
been given. Yet it is unlikely that satisfaction of the burden of proving
independent origin would be particularly difficult in those circumstances. If, in fact, all the evidence had been gathered earlier, the
prosecution would merely have to show the date, the content, and the
results of its interrogations and examinations, all of which could be
corroborated by the participating individuals. Consequently, a considerable amount of evidence might be gathered by the prosecution well
before the bankruptcy proceeding begins.
A more difficult problem would be presented if the investigation
was commenced during or after the compelled testimony was given.
In that case the prosecution might find that every source of evidence
had been exposed, perhaps consciously, by the immunized testimony,
rendering the acquisition of completely independent evidence nearly
impossible. But the bankrupt's complete and detailed disclosure will
not necessarily preclude an independently constructed criminal case
against him. He cannot "taint" every source of evidence merely by
disclosing it in his own testimony. On the contrary, the use-restriction
rule would only prohibit the prosecution from investigating a source
of evidence which it discovered through the bankrupt's testimony. The
requirement of an "independent source" means that the source must
have been discovered independently; it does not mean that the prosecution must find a source of evidence which was not mentioned in the
immunized testimony.
There may be some question concerning the appropriateness of the
use-restriction rule in the single sovereignty context of bankruptcy.
Unlike the setting of Murphy, the jurisdictional conflict in bankruptcy
is secondary. While the bankrupt may be asked to make disclosures
incriminating him under state, rather than federal law, what is more
119 This conclusion is identical to that reached in Comment, supra note 79, at 584.
120 United States v. Pappadio, 235 F. Supp. 887, 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 346
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds sub nor., Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966).
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important is that the federal government-unlike the state governments in Murphy-still retains the authority to prosecute the bankrupt
for federal offenses revealed in the bankruptcy proceeding. This is
the principal distinction between the adoption of use-restriction in
single and dual sovereignty settings. If in the single sovereignty setting, the jurisdiction in which disclosure is compelled immunizes the
disclosed offense, the use-restriction rule would have no prosecution
on which to operate. Thus, the purpose of the rule would be defeated.
In the dual sovereignty setting, as in Murphy,12 ' immunization might
be granted with respect to offenses subject to prosecution in that jurisdiction, allowing the use-restriction rule to operate against prosecutions
by the other sovereign. Failure of the jurisdiction compelling disclosure to confer absolute immunity, however, would not seem to pose
a problem. If, as the Court decided in Murphy, use-restriction would
provide adequate protection in the event of prosecution by a foreign
jurisdiction, then it ought to ensure at least the same measure of protection when applied in the jurisdiction in which the witness is compelled to testify." 2
The application of a use-restriction rule in a single sovereignty
context would be manifestly inappropriate if the primary purpose for
seeking disclosure was to gather evidence for use in a prosecution of
the witness. Since the rule would render the compelled testimony and
its fruits inadmissible against him, the incriminating evidence could
not be put to the very purpose for which its disclosure would be comIn bankruptcy, however, this is not a problem, for prosecupelled.'
tion of bankrupts is not the principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. 2 4
121378 U.S. 52, 53 (1964).

=Mr. Justice White, concurring in Murphy, specifically approved the adoption
of a use-restriction rule in a single sovereignty context: "In my view it is possible for
a federal prosecution to be based on untainted evidence after a grant of federal
immunity in exchange for testimony in a federal criminal investigation." 378 U.S.
at 106.
1See
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968), in which Mr. Justice
Harlan, delivering the opinion of the Court, declined to apply the Murphy rule to the
federal wagering tax statute. Finding that the principle purpose of the wagering tax
statute was not to raise revenue, but rather, to gather evidence for use by state
authorities against violators of state gaming laws, he reasoned that use-restriction
would be inappropriate in those circumstances. Id. at 56-60. He was also of the
opinion that the decision to apply the rule to the enforcement of statutory law is one
which should be made by Congress, not by the Court. Id. at 59-60. It should be
noted, however, that his opinion gives no indication that the single sovereignty context
in any way precludes adoption of the Murphy rule. See text accompanying note 122
supra.
124See Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913), where Justice Holmes,
speaking about the requirement that the bankrupt transfer possession of his books and
papers to the trustee, said that "[ilt is compelled by the law as a necessary incident
to the distribution of his property, not in order to obtain criminal evidence against
him." Id. at 459.
See also Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 150 (1923), where the same position is
taken by Chief Justice Taft. Moreover, in contrast to the individuals subject to the
requirements of the federal wagering tax statute in Marchetti, bankrupts are not "a
highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities." See Marchetti v.
United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
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In a proceeding in which no criminal violations are involved, the userestriction rule would be particularly appropriate. Of course, where a
bankruptcy crime has been committed, the disclosure requirements
facilitate detection and punishment. But even in that case, the provisions compelling full disclosure are not primarily designed to provide
evidence to be used in a prosecution against the dishonest bankrupt.
Rather, their purpose is to provide relief for his creditors-the victims
of his dishonesty-and to prevent his enjoyment of the benefits of the
Bankruptcy Act.
It is not suggested that the rationale for the Murphy decision is
applicable to the bankruptcy situation. In that case the problem of
compelled incrimination was merely the setting from which the principal
issue arose, that of the conflicting interests of state and federal law
enforcement. Use-restriction was a means to settle a conflict of
sovereignties. In bankruptcy the problems raised by compelled disclosure are themselves of primary concern, and it is the individual,
rather than the state, whose interests conflict with those of the federal
government. In these circumstances, a use-restriction rule is justified
by a different principle: that is, the government should not take unfair
advantage of the broad scope of inquiry and the heavy burden of disclosure imposed on a civil litigant in order to gather evidence for use
That the government has
against him in a subsequent prosecution.
not initiated the bankruptcy proceeding, nor prompted the creditors to
demand incriminating disclosure, is not important.1 "6 It must be
125 See, e.g., Silver v. McCamey, 221 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; United States v.
Parrott, 248 F. Supp. 196 (D.D.C. 1965); United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929
(D. Colo. 1963). See generally Note, Commingled Civil and Criminal Proceedings: A
Peek at ConstitutionalLimitations and a Poke at the SEC, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
527 (1966).
126 Even when the government takes no active part in the compulsion exerted
by the bankrupt's creditors to seek disclosure and is not in collusion with them, it has
been strongly urged that the principles of fairness embodied in Rule 30(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should justify some form of relief from attempts
to discover incriminating evidence. See United States v. Simon, 373 F.2d 649, 654
(2d Cir. 1967) (Feinberg, J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. Simon v. Wharton, 389
U.S. 425 (1968). Moreover, in the event of concurrent civil and criminal proceedings,
the general principle that the government should not be permitted to circumvent the
limitations of criminal discovery by taking advantage of evidence disclosed in the
process of civil discovery has been argued to be applicable even though the government neither initiates nor participates in the civil proceeding. See Note, Concurrent
Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 67 CoLum. L. REv. 1277, 1282-84 (1967).
If a use-restriction rule were sought to be imposed in bankruptcy without statutory authority, the fact that the parties seeking disclosure are private individuals,
rather than a public prosecutor, might preclude the use of that device. Since it is the
public which must bear whatever prosecutory burden that a use-restriction rule might
conceivably impose, it may be legitimately maintained that the decision to grant even
this limited form of immunity is one which only the government is in a position to
make. On the other hand, if the Murphy rule were made available in bankruptcy by
statutory authority, with its applicability contingent on a proper claim of privilege in
response to a material question approved by the referee, then there would be sufficient
assurance that it would not be made available in unwarranted circumstances. In that
case, an objection to its application merely on the ground that no immunity of any
degree should be granted at the behest of private parties, for whose sole benefit it
would operate, seems to conflict with the result in Murphy, where the party seeking
disclosure, albeit a government, had no more concern for the interests of federal
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remembered that the creditors do not seek a common law remedy, but
rather one created by statute. Since the procedures of bankruptcy and
the conditions imposed on its benefits have been established by statute,
the government's involvement is no less real than if it had actually
initiated the proceeding or had become a party to it through the
Attorney General's intervention in the hearing on objection to
discharge.
VI. CONCLUSION

The protection offered by the privilege against self-incrimination
in bankruptcy cannot compensate for the penalty which the bankrupt
must sustain, or justify the deprivation that his creditors must suffer
for its invocation. The interests of creditor compensation and the
protection of the bankrupt would be better safeguarded and advanced
through the adoption of a use-restriction rule, which would substantially eliminate the conflict between these objectives. Since the Murphy
rule would eliminate the danger of self-incrimination, the bankrupt's
cooperation would be more readily won. Because it would remove the
privilege against self-incrimination, his active participation in the proceeding could be assured, to the benefit and increased compensation of
his creditors.
law enforcement than would creditors in bankruptcy. If a state may trigger the
imposition of a use-restriction rule on subsequent federal prosecution, then there
seems to be little justification for saying that the bankrupt's creditors, when the
circumstances warrant, cannot do likewise.

